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ABSTRACT 
 
After the Great Recession, there has been speculation as to whether it is possible to 
effectively detect systemic risk in the financial sector in order to guide macroprudential policy. 
This paper explores how aggregate indicators may be significant in forecasting banking crises 
among and across advanced economies. The paper begins by reviewing financial crisis theory 
and noteworthy qualitative frameworks and quantitative models for predicting financial crises. 
Mindful of the literature and models, machine learning techniques are used to assess the 
significance of 26 indicators in forecasting crises, two years in advance, for 20 high income 
countries. The classification models per country indicate that domestic credit to the private 
sector, as a percent of GDP, is the most common significant indicator in forecasting banking 
crises. When creating classification models inclusive of all countries, which are assumed to be of 
comparable financial depth, the bank lending-deposit spread becomes the most significant 
indicator. While the specificity of the models per country were quite high, the specificity 
dropped dramatically for models across countries. Overall, the results indicate a significant 
relationship between indicators of financial depth and banking crises, however, more data is 
needed to build upon these models to ensure their robustness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Eight years after its onset, the impacts of the Global Financial Crisis persist. The United 
States economy and others still suffer from below pre-crisis rates of growth, due to the credit 
boom gone “bad.” The fear of deflationary spirals fueled extensive quantitative easing measures, 
both domestically and abroad. In addition to enormous bailouts, the Federal Reserve is keeping 
interest rates low,1 despite signs of robust recovery.2  
In light of the ramifications of the crisis, there is pressure for the Federal Reserve, and 
similar institutions abroad, to go beyond measures of recovery and to implement policies which 
serve to detect and avoid similar crises in the future. However there exists widespread skepticism 
as to whether it is possible to effectively mitigate such crises.3 This skepticism stems from the 
belief that policies aimed at reducing systemic risk would also hamper positive growth, 
essentially over-pricing risk,4 because of their inability to differentiate a “good” credit boom 
from one that will likely end in a bust. In other words, such policy would treat every credit boom 
as though it would result in crisis even if the credit boom was actually tied to a positive change 
in market fundamentals. Moreover, a recent study by the IMF showed that only one in three 
credit booms end in financial crisis,5 which may provide reason to question widespread, stringent 
regulation. However, in theory, if there was an ability to differentiate the good from the bad, then 
                                                
1 See Appendix Figure 1.1 U.S. Federal Funds Rate, 2006-2015 
2 See Appendix Figures 1.2 & 1.3 on U.S. Unemployment and Real GDP Growth for signs of robust recovery post 
crisis 
3 On October 5th, 2015, the New York Times published an article “Policy makers skeptical on preventing financial 
crisis” covering Federal Reserve Conference in which these doubts were expressed over the ability to detect 
financial crises 
4 See Appendix Figure 1.4 Financial Sector Vulnerability to Shocks and Pricing of Risk comparing the pricing of 
risk in periods of higher regulation versus lesser regulation 
5IMF study “Policies for macrofinancial stability: How to deal with credit boom” based definition of credit boom on 
above trend credit growth!
!  5 
there could be appropriate intervention through the use of macroprudential policy, which 
encompasses a set of tools to avoid periods of financial instability.  
This paper sets to explore indicators that may be helpful in predicting banking crises 
amongst advanced economies. First, the paper will present a brief background on financial crisis 
theory. Next, noteworthy qualitative and quantitative models for predicting financial crises will 
be discussed. Mindful of these models, machine learning techniques are used to explore how 
indicators from the Global Financial Development Database, concerning financial depth, 
efficiency, stability and other general economic indicators, may be useful in forecasting banking 
crises. Lastly, the paper discusses how these results may have implications for the tailoring and 
execution of macroprudential policy.  
FINANCIAL CRISES BACKGROUND 
 
Development of Financial Crisis Theory  
Theories that financial instability could arise from built-up imbalances within the 
financial system have not always been widely accepted, despite their long histories. References 
to such phenomena date back to Adam Smith’s use of “over-trading” to explain financial crises. 
More specifically, he described “a general error committed by large and small traders when the 
profits from trade happen to be greater than normal.” (Adam Smith 1776, 406) Smith’s theory is 
then corroborated by other economists over time, such as Mathew Carey and John Stuart Mill, 
that note that “the credit cycle breeds optimism which in turn breeds recklessness and leads to a 
crises and stagnation.” (Mullineux 1990, 64) It is important to note that this set of theories 
suggest booms start by a true positive change in market fundamentals, such as increased demand, 
but then irrational exuberance, endogenous to the system, propagates the cycle and then leads to 
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the extension of credit beyond sustainable levels. Moreover, this suggests a link between 
business cycles and financial cycles. 
Irving Fisher, renowned for this analysis of the the debt-deflation relationship that 
resulted in the Great Depression, goes further in outlining the process from boom to depression. 
“In the great booms and depressions, each of the above-named factors has a played a subordinate 
role as compared with two dominant factors, namely over-indebtedness to start with and 
deflation start soon after… In short the big bad actors are debt-disturbances and price-level 
disturbances.” (Fisher 1933, 341) Moreover, this “double trigger” of over-indebtedness and 
deflation, refers to when credit is extended to such a degree that it then becomes nearly 
impossible to pay off, during a deflationary period, as the debt increases in real terms.  
Fisher outlines the following sequence of events which further describes this process: 
“Assuming a state of over-indebtedness exists, this will tend to lead to liquidation, 
through the alarm either of debtors or creditors or both. Then we may deduce the 
following chain of consequences in nine links: (1) Debt liquidation leads to distress 
setting and to (2) Contraction of deposit currency, as bank loans are paid off, and to a 
slowing down of velocity of circulation. This contraction of deposits and of their 
velocity, precipitated by distress selling, causes (3) A fall in the level of prices, in other 
words, a swelling of the dollar. Assuming, as above stated, that this fall of prices is not 
interfered with by reflation or otherwise, there must be (4) A still greater fall in the net 
worths of business, precipitating bankruptcies and (5) A like fall in profits, which in a " 
capitalistic," that is, a private-profit society, leads the concerns which are running at a 
loss to make (6) A reduction in output, in trade and in employment of labor. These losses, 
bankruptcies, and unemployment, lead to (7) Pessimism and loss of confidence, which in 
turn lead to (8) Hoarding and slowing down still more the velocity of circulation.  
The above eight changes cause (9) Complicated disturbances in the rates of interest, in 
particular, a fall in the nominal, or money, rates and a rise in the real, or commodity, rates 
of interest.” (Fisher 1933, 344) 
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This sequence of events gives an interesting perspective on the relationship between the financial 
cycle and the real economy as downward financial swings are perpetuated throughout the real 
economy, reducing output, trade, employment and breading pessimism and loss of confidence. 
Building on Irving’s analysis, economist Hyman Minsky outlined the Minsky Financial 
Instability Hypothesis. This theory asserts that because of capitalistic incentives, sustained 
expansion alone will be endogenously converted into a boom. In other words, the inherent nature 
of the financial system “will ultimately lead to expansion even in the absence of a shock…short 
and eventually long term interest rates can be expected to rise and the discounted present value 
of future profits flows will be reduced. Speculative and Ponzi units will have to sell assets to 
meet their payment commitments.” (Mullineux 1990, 76) The Minsky Hypothesis therefore 
states that there is no need for an external positive shock to incite the onset of a credit boom nor 
an adverse shock for “bad” outcomes to be induced. The system of financial crises is therefore 
entirely endogenous.6 Minsky’s hypothesis has gained much attention since the Great Recession 
and become influential to recent policy concerning the detection of systemic risk.  
Financial Crises as a Market Failure 
Financial crises can be more generally described as a market failure resulting from a 
moral hazard problem. In the case of financial markets, there is an incentive for financial 
institutions to underprice risk because, absent regulation, they are not solely burdened by the 
costs associated with the results of wider systemic risk. In other words, should systemic risk 
result in crises, the public at large shares the burden of the market failure and the costs are 
                                                
6 See Appendix Figure 1.5 Financial and Business Cycles in the United States published by the Bank of International 
Settlements which shows deviation of financial cycles from business cycles, particularly in their amplitude and 
duration.  
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therefore not internalized by the individual firm. For example, a staff report by the Federal 
Reserve entitled “Financial Stability Monitoring” explained the instance of a firm’s choice to 
increase leverage.  
“When deciding whether to increase leverage, a financial institution might weigh the 
firm’s higher expected bankruptcy costs (the private marginal cost) against the tax and 
cost advantages of funding more with debt finance (the private marginal benefit). 
However, the public marginal cost of the additional leverage exceeds the private marginal 
cost as it includes also any associated increases in expected bankruptcy costs at other 
institutions that might be caused by say the increased risk of either fire sales or other 
forms of contagion.” (Adrian, Covitz, and Liang 2013) 
Further incentivizing firms is also limited downside risk due to government safety nets 
for large financial institutions. Firms considered “too big to fail”, have implicit government 
backing because of their particularly wide-spread influence, driven by their size, interconnected-
ness, and ability to spark panic. Moreover, as financial institutions have limited liability, their 
“default put option” is extremely valuable.  Overall, for large financial institutions “it is rational 
for them to take on riskier behavior because they will be able to capture the profits while 
socializing the losses among taxpayers.” (Sitaraman 2014) This results in a system that breeds 
risky behavior and discounts costs associated with risks of participating in the market, such as 
losses, failure and acquisition.  
Macroprudential Policy as a Solution 
In cases of moral hazard, regulation seems like an intuitive response to internalize the 
costs of risk. However, there must be means of appropriately monitoring systemic risk to inform 
regulation. Macroprudential policy encompasses a set of tools to promote financial stability 
through regulation concerning reporting, incentives and capital requirements, among others.  
Moreover, it aims to address the two dimensions of financial instability.  The first is the 
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dimension of time. As the financial system is pro-cyclical, capital ratios approaching a financial 
crisis are below what is possible to remain solvent. Then, during the crisis, regulations increase 
and loan-to value ratios plummet even further restricting access to credit, exacerbating the 
downturn of the crisis. Therefore, one prong of macroprudential instruments is aimed to address 
the pro-cyclical nature of the financial market to prepare banks during good times to withstand 
the bad. The second dimension is that of interconnectedness. This dimension refers to the 
exposures that occur due to balance sheet inter-linkages and associated behavioral responses 
across financial institutions.  In this regard, macroprudential policy works to minimize the 
amplified effects of shocks due to spillovers across institutions.  
Macroprudential policy is not a new concept and has been implemented by numerous 
nations to varying degrees.7 However, it’s renewed attention is most evident by the formation of 
the Basel Accords II and III by the Bank of International Settlements. The accords focus on the 
three main areas of capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline.8 Moreover, 
the accords also include a dimension of international coordination given the role that integrated 
capital markets play in spillover effects to institutions outside of one’s own country.  
CURRENT MEANS OF DETECTION 
With an understanding of the theory and motivations of endogenous financial cycles, 
models have been created to detect symptoms indicative of periods of high systemic risk and 
                                                
7!Policy examples with a focus on aggregate credit dynamics include Spain’s dynamic provisioning, loan eligibility 
requirements of Hong Kong & the multi-pronged approach of the Croatian Central Bank 
8!Instruments in macroprudential toolkit include: 1.  risk measurement methodologies; 2. financial reporting 
accounting standards; 3. regulatory capital requirements; 4. funding liquidity standards; 5. collateral arrangements; 
6. risk concentration limits;7. restrictions on permissible activities;8. compensation schemes;9. insurance 
mechanisms;10. and managing failure and resolution.!
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which may even point to specific areas of market vulnerability. In recent years, there have been 
many contributions to this literature, however, this paper will review only a few noteworthy 
qualitative frameworks and quantitative models which were particularly influential in guiding the 
exploration of the Global Financial Development Database. 
Qualitative Frameworks 
Mansharmani on the Five Lenses 
Vikram Mansharmani’s book, “Boombustology”, advocates a holistic framework through 
which to predict financial crises.  As a “generalist” he assesses the following areas: reflexive 
dynamics, excessive leverage, overconfidence, policy distortions and herd-like behavior. He then 
applies these lenses to five great busts: Tulipmania, the Great Depression, the Japanese Boom 
and Bust, the Asian Financial Crisis and the latest U.S. Housing boom and bust. The first area, 
reflexive dynamics, refers to the tendency of higher prices to stimulate additional demand during 
booms and lower prices to dissuade demand during busts.  The second, relating to the “double-
trigger”, refers to the presence of financial innovation (that results when demand for securities on 
behalf of investors incentivizes the creation of new forms of securities by intermediaries) as well 
as signs of “cheap” money and moral hazard. The third, overconfidence, is shown through 
conspicuous spending, such as trophy purchases, art auction prices and creation of skyscrapers,9 
as well as new age thinking pertaining to technology, war and economic status, among others.  
The fourth is the presence of policies distorting the price-discovery process. And lastly, herd-like 
behavior parallels the biological phenomena of epidemics and emergence.10 
                                                
9 Skyscraper Index was coined by property analyst Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein in January 1999, who noted that 
the world's tallest buildings have risen on the eve of economic downturns because of their speculative nature 
10 See Appendix Figure 2.1 Boombustology Lenses and Associated Indicators  !
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This framework offers a very broad view through which to detect policy that spans the 
market, policy and societal trends. While comprehensive and insightful, the framework does not 
easily lend itself to firm quantitative indicators or thresholds which regulators could be held 
accountable for detecting. However, the area of reflective dynamics concerning above trend 
pricing may be a very helpful quantitative indicator by which to assess vulnerabilities in asset 
markets. 
The Federal Reserve on Cyclical Vulnerabilities  
The Federal Reserve staff report “Financial Stability Monitoring” provides an extensive 
framework through which to monitor system risk. This framework focuses on the detection of 
market vulnerabilities as opposed to shocks.  
“For example, the popping of an asset price bubble (i.e. the sharp reversal of inflated 
asset valuations) would constitute a shock to the financial system. The popping of a 
bubble is an event that is difficult to predict, yet it can trigger a chain reaction that would 
ultimately impact the financial system’s capacity to intermediate. The possibility of an 
asset price bubble therefore constitutes a vulnerability: it implies that asset prices could 
correct sharply downward in reaction to an adverse shock. (Adrian, Covitz, and Liang 
2013) 
More specifically, the framework suggests the detection of vulnerabilities in the following areas: 
asset markets, banks, shadow banking, and nonfinancial sector. The vulnerabilities take the form 
of leverage, maturity transformation without government insurance, compressed pricing of risk, 
interconnectedness, and complexity. Unlike the previous framework, the Federal Reserve’s 
framework does lend itself to specific quantitative metrics. This framework was foundational to 
the Federal Reserve’s heat map to detect system-wide vulnerabilities (further discussed in 
quantitative models). However, the authors concede that such measures must be complemented 
by a broader knowledge of the financial system.  
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Quantitative Models 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) on the Credit-to-GDP Gap 
The BIS advocates that the credit-to-GDP gap be used as the indicator to guide policy to 
avoid financial crises, particularly policy concerning countercyclical capital buffers. This gap 
constitutes the difference between rates of credit growth and GDP growth. This measure, 
therefore, compares growth in the real economy to growth in credit to show when there are 
significant deviations from the business cycle and the financial sector. This indicator exemplifies 
the aspect of over-indebtedness that tends to precede financial crises. 
The BIS quarterly review, published March 2014, states that the credit gap “is the EWI 
(early warning indicator) of banking crises, having the best overall statistical performance among 
single indicators…It also satisfies the three policy requirements (pertaining to adequate timing, 
stability and interpretability), and its calculation requires data (credit and GDP) which are 
generally available in most jurisdictions. These characteristics are essential considering that the 
BCBS guidance underpins a globally harmonized framework.” (Drehmann, Tsatsaronis 2014 
,59) Moreover, the study reaches these findings by analyzing the data of 26 countries from 1980 
to 2012. The study compares the performance of the credit gap to 5 other indicators: credit 
growth, GDP growth, residential property price growth, the debt service ratio (DSR) and the 
non-core liability ratio. Furthermore, the study used the area under the receiver operating 
characteristics curve (AUC) as a statistical tool to make these comparisons. This tool essentially 
summarizes the trade off between correct and false signals. The results indicate that the credit 
gap is significantly more accurate than other proposed indicators.11 
                                                
11 See Appendix Figure 2.2 Bank of International Settlements’ Comparison of Early Warning Indicators 
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The study does concede that “combinations of indicators could also act as benchmarks. 
Indeed, research points to composite indicators that statistically outperform the credit-to-GDP 
gap (such as asset price gaps and debt service ratios) .” (Drehmann, Tsatsaronis 2014, 62) 
Moreover, while the credit-to-GDP may be a robust indicator, it certainly does not encapsulate 
all vulnerabilities in the four markets (assets, banks, shadow banking, non financial sector). 
Several financial and supervisory institutions have created more comprehensive models building 
on the credit-to-GDP gap to increase their strength.  
Bank of England on Credit-to-GDP Gap and Complementary Indicators 
The Bank of England introduced a framework in 2014 on the basis of 18 core indicators, 
including the credit gap, to evaluate aggregate vulnerabilities and making decisions regarding 
capital buffers. These additional indicators relate primarily to conditions in the residential and 
commercial property markets and sometimes include bank liabilities. Similar to the BIS, the 
Bank of England employed the AUC technique to compare 36 possible indicators using data only 
pertaining to England.12 The study concluded the following: 
“The credit gap indicators tend to perform reasonably well, with high and statistically 
significant AUROCs. The signal ratios at the noise-minimising threshold are all 
statistically significant and comfortably above zero, while the noise ratios at the signal-
maximizing threshold are reasonably low and statistically significant. The precise sectors 
covered do not make a lot of difference in this sample. Nor does the choice between 
broad and narrow credit. This is not surprising, as they are highly correlated. The flow- 
based credit measures tend to perform less well than the gap metrics, with real growth 
rates of credit outperforming nominal growth rates, though not by much.” 
The study goes on to suggest that indicators could then be combined into a logit 
regression or heat map to more precisely guide policy.  
                                                
12 See Appendix Figure 2.3 Central Bank of England’s Comparison of Early Warning Indicators 
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Federal Reserve Heat Map 
Utilizing the framework offered by the Federal Reserve Staff Report “Financial System 
Monitoring,” a heat map was created in August 2015 to detect financial system vulnerabilities.  
The heat map utilizes 44 indicators ranging across three broad categories: valuation pressures 
and risk appetite, nonfinancial imbalances and financial sector imbalances. The first category 
encompasses indicators in the housing, commercial real estate and equity markets. The second 
assesses indicators concerning volume, quality and repayment burden of debt. The last category 
includes indicators pertaining to bank and non-bank leverage, maturity transformation, short-
term funding, and other indicators of size and concentration within the financial sector. Overall, 
the heat map is a very comprehensive model that meets all three standards of the BIS as it is 
timely, stable and simple to interpret. Although the indicators were very influential in guiding the 
exploration of data that follows, many of those in the heat map have not been collected beyond 
recent history for many nations. 
 
EXPLORING GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT DATA 
Objective 
 
The objective of this exploration is to utilize the data afforded by the Global Financial 
Development Database to create classification models which forecast crises among and across 
advanced economies. Models are to meet the three standards set by the BIS: 
1.! Timing: Early warning indicators must provide signals early enough for policy measures 
to take effect. For this reason, the dependent variable was the presence of a banking crisis 
two years into the future. In order to derive more significant results, two models were 
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created to detect crises across countries, the first predicting two years in advance and the 
second predicting one year in advance. 
2.! Stability: The indicator should be robust and stable to be conducive to decisive policy 
action. For all models, confusion matrix measures are given to compare sensitivity, 
specificity, false positive rates and accuracy. 
3.! Interpretability: Forecasts and signals that policymakers find complicated to understand 
are not conducive to policy action. For this reason, classification models were chosen as 
they provide decision trees that are easy to follow and present clear thresholds to forecast 
crises.  
Scope  
 
Data Set & Indicators 
The Global Financial Development Database is the World Bank’s extensive dataset of 
financial system characteristics for 203 economies. The database includes measures pertaining to 
the following categories: size of financial institutions and markets (financial depth), degree to 
which individuals can and do use financial services (access), efficiency of financial 
intermediaries and markets in intermediating resources and facilitating financial transactions 
(efficiency), and stability of financial institutions and markets (stability). 
Although there were 84 indicators in the data, very few were collected beyond recent 
history. Many data points of acute interest were only collected starting the late 1990s.13 In an 
                                                
13 Data relating more directly to deteriorating underwriting standard, such as loan to value ratios, and the 
competiveness of the financial sector, indicting the presence of “too big to fail institutions and therefore a high level 
of interconnectedness, have only been collected in more recent history. This is a reflection of a high period of 
deregulations in the 1980s and a greater understanding of systemic risk thereafter. 
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attempt to avoid overfitting the model to the most recent global crisis, only indicators collected 
since the 1980s were utilized, leaving 26 variables to test in the data set.14 
Countries for Comparison 
 For this paper, only data pertaining to advanced economies will be reviewed. More 
specifically, these are countries with a GDP per capita above $35,708.843961605. This indicator 
was chosen as it is considered a standard measure of economic development. The specific 
amount was chosen because the World Bank considers this threshold to define “high income” 
countries. This allowed for 20 countries for comparison in the final dataset.15 Advanced 
economies were of interest for two reasons: 
1.! These countries have the most complete data sets for the chosen time period. 
2.! Advanced economies are likely to have similarities in financial depth and in their use of 
complex financial instruments.16 
Banking Crisis 
 
The dependent variable afforded by the data is the presence of a systemic banking crisis 
indicated by the binary 0, for no crisis, or 1 for crisis. Crisis has been defined by the World Bank 
as follows: 
“A banking crisis is defined as systemic if two conditions are met: a. Significant signs of 
financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in 
the banking system, and/or bank liquidations), b. Significant banking policy intervention 
measures in response to significant losses in the banking system. The first year that both 
criteria are met is considered as the year when the crisis start becoming systemic.  The 
end of a crisis is defined the year before both real GDP growth and real credit growth are 
positive for at least two consecutive years.” 
 
                                                
14 See Appendix Figure 3.1 GFDD Indicator Descriptions for the descriptions of the indicators used from the 
database and Appendix Figure 3.2 All Independent Variables Tested for all independent variables tested which 
includes modifications of these indicators and the presence of a banking crises in t-1 and 1-2 periods 
15 See Appendix 3.3: High Income Countries List 
16 The IMF study “Policies for macrofinancial stability: How to deal with credit boom” provides evidence that 
countries of different stages of economic development vary significantly in their number and tolerance of credit 
booms 
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Methodology 
 The following is the sequence of steps taken to explore the data: 
1.! Determine advanced economies through GDP per capita threshold. 
2.! Determine indicators of relevance based on literature review and availability in the 
desired time period of study. 
3.! Create variations of indicators (as explained in Data Set & Indicators). 
4.! Create classification tree models, using cross validation to avoid overfitting, for 
individual countries and across countries to forecast crises in advance. 
5.! Analyze results to determine which variables were significant. 
 
Limitations 
 
The provided data was extremely limited. More precise and robust models will require 
variables that assess vulnerabilities across the four markets of interest, namely, assets, banking, 
shadow banking, and the nonfinancial sector. The issue of data size also limited the ability to use 
cross validation techniques to avoid overfitting. For this reason, this paper views the models 
created as an exploration of significant predictors that may be significant when creating more 
complex models in the future with wider datasets. The models are also limited as their 
implications pertain to specifically high income countries and will have limited applications for 
low and middle income countries. 
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Results 
The classification trees created per country were highly accurate. The ranges for the 
confusion matrix measures (below) indicate that ability to predict positive and negative outcomes 
was high and compromised very little by false positive rates, below 0.8.17  
 
Figure 1.1 Ranges of Confusion Matrix Measures for Country Classification Trees 
Sensitivity Specificity False Positive Rates Accuracy 
(0.92, 1) (0.8333, 1) (0, 0.08) (0.9333, 1) 
 
The individual classification trees indicate that “Domestic credit to private sector (% of 
GDP” was the most common predicator variable across models, followed by “GDP (Current 
USD)”.  Other significant indicators included “Bank deposits to GDP (%)”, “Bank credit to bank 
deposits (%)”, “Liquid liabilities in millions USD (2000 constant)” and “Central bank assets to 
GDP.” 
Figure 1.2 Results of Country Classification Trees by Predictor Variable 
                                                
17 See Appendix Figures 3.4 Detailed Country Classification Tree Outcomes and Figures 3.5-3.19 for the 
Classification Trees for each country 
Predictor Variable Category Frequency Countries 
GDP (Current USD) Economic 
Policy & 
Debt  
4 Austria 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Bank deposits to GDP (%) Other 2 Denmark 
Norway 
 Domestic credit to private sector (% 
of GDP) 
Depth 5 Finland 
Japan 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Bank credit to bank deposits (%) Stability 2 Germany 
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The variables range across categories although the most common is that of Financial 
Depth, unsurprisingly, as above trend financial expansion points towards over-indebtedness. 
However, GDP growth would suggest a change, not only in the financial sector, but also the real 
economy showing that the connection between real growth and financial sector cycles is not to 
be understated. Also of interest in the results was the present of Central Bank Assets to GDP in 
predicting financial crises in Switzerland. This indicates that traditional monetary policy may 
still be influential to the onset and deterrence of financial crises in addition to macroprudential 
policy. 
 
In an attempt to assess significant indicators across countries with comparable financial 
depth, and of similar financial sector complexity, a classification tree was created to find 
significant indicators across advanced economies. This classification model scored significantly 
worse in specificity, at only 0.10, however the overall accuracy of the model was 0.8967 and 
there was a false positive rate of 0. 19 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 This was the only indicator in which going below the threshold pointed towards crisis 
19 See Appendix 3.20 Confusion Matrix Measures 2 Year (left) v. 1 Year Forecast (Right) 
 
Ireland 
Liquid liabilities in millions USD 
(2000 constant) 
Depth 1 Iceland 
Central bank assets to GDP (%)18 Depth 1 Switzerland 
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Figure 1.3 Classification Tree Across Advanced Economies to Forecast 2 Years Ahead 
 
 
 
To explore whether the specificity rate could be improved, a classification tree was 
created to forecast crises only one year in advance. The specificity rate improved to 0.26, 
however, this did compromise the false positive rate slightly, increasing from 0 to 0.0036832. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank-Lending Deposit Spread 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) Mutual Fund Assets to GDP (%) 
Private credit by deposit money 
banks to GDP (%) 
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Figure 1.4 Classification Tree Across Advanced Economies to Forecast 1 Year Ahead 
 
      
 
INSIGHTS & CONCLUSION 
 
Key takeaways 
 
The exploration of the dataset made it clear that data on financial depth and stability in 
has been lacking. Furthermore, while there has been a dramatic uptake in data collection post 
2008,20 this provides a limited foundation by which to create models that can accurately detect 
systemic risk at the macro level. Of particular interest for future studies will be indicators 
                                                
20 See Appendix Figure 4.1 Financial Soundness Indicators: Reporting Countries and Economies on  
The International Monetary Fund’s data collection trends!
Bank-Lending Deposit Spread 
Banking Crisis T-1 
Bank Deposits to GDP Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
Bank credit to bank deposits (%) 
Bank credit to bank 
deposits (%) 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of 
GDP) 
Life insurance premium volume 
to GDP (%) 
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concerning capital-to-risk weighted assets, loan-to-value ratios, the Lerner index, and others, 
which point directly towards the deterioration of underwriting standards and structural 
vulnerabilities in the financial sector. 
While there was significant overlap in the indicators that appeared in the literature review 
and those that proved significant in the models, the degree of significance of the bank lending-
deposit spread was unexpected, as terms and conditions of rates vary across countries. However, 
perhaps across high income countries, with similar practices, the bank lending-deposit spread 
may be a more significant indicator to be incorporated in future models. Moreover, as 
macroprudential policy also incorporates elements of international coordination, the use of the 
bank lending-deposit spread as a cross-country indicator, may be helpful in macroprudential 
policy implementation.   
Both in models for individual countries and across countries, false positive rates were 
extremely low. Furthermore, increasing the complexity of models only slightly compromised 
false positive rates. This may indicate that the fear of over-pricing risk is not as significant a 
trade-off to preventing crises. Overall, these models support that early warning indicators may be 
useful to guiding macroprudential policy, without significantly compromising growth.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
While large institutions with an interest in global economy, such as prominent 
universities and the Bretton Woods Institutions, have conducted significant studies in the arena 
of financial cycles and systemic risk, data of macro-aggregates is still in need of further analysis. 
More specifically, the results of this study indicate that significant indicators may be correlated 
within regions, not only among nations of comparable economic development, and therefore 
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models at the regional level should also be tested. Furthermore, the use of “random forests” as a 
statistical method could be used to combine the results of the individual country decision trees to 
draw further insights, as opposed to combining the data across countries, in an effort to avoid 
overfitting models to the very limited data available.  Additionally, the strength of the indicators 
in this study indicate that macroprudential policy, on the whole, may be a practical solution with 
limited tradeoffs. However, further research is needed on the costs of macroprudential policy in 
correcting specific areas of market vulnerabilities, as these may vary.  
Even with significant gains in this area of research, institutional memory has begun to 
fade. The United States financial cycle has moved into a full upswing once more. Loans to 
private sector reached an all time high of 2023.14 USD Billion in March of 201621 and the 
biggest banks are 37 percent larger than they were before crisis. It is clear that robust and precise 
models are still needed to facilitate decisive, forward-looking, policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 See Appendix Figure 4.2 U.S. Commercial and Industrial Loans (2006-2016) 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1.1 U.S. Federal Funds Rate Over Time (2006-2015) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 U.S. Unemployment Rate Over Time (2007-2015) 
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Figure 1.3 U.S. Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP (1990-2014) 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Financial Sector Vulnerability to Shocks and Pricing of Risk 
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Figure 1.5 U.S. Financial and Business Cycles Over Time (1970-2011) 
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Figure 2.1 Boombustology Lenses and Associated Indicators 
 
Lense        Indicators 
Reflexive Dynamics •! Credit Criteria 
•! Collateral Credit 
•! Hot Money 
Leverage/ Deflation •! Financial Innovation 
•! Cheap/Excessive Money 
•! Moral Hazard 
Overconfidence •! Conspicous Consumption 
•! New-Era Thinking 
Policy Distortion •! Supply/Demand Manipulation 
•! Regulatory Shift 
Consensus/Herd •! Amateur investors 
•! Silent Leadership 
•! Popular Media 
 
Figure 2.2 Bank of International Settlements’ Comparison of Early Warning Indicators 
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Figure 2.4 Central Bank of England’s Comparison of Early Warning Indicators 
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Figure 3.1 GFDD Indicator Descriptions 
!
Indicator Name 
Indicator 
Code Type Definition Short (As provided by World Bank) 
Time 
Period 
Central bank assets 
to GDP (%) GFDD.DI.06 Depth 
Ratio of central bank assets to GDP. Central bank assets are 
claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central 
Bank. 1961-2013 
Deposit money 
bank assets to 
deposit money 
bank assets and 
central bank assets 
(%) GFDD.DI.04 Depth 
Total assets held by deposit money banks as a share of sum of 
deposit money bank and Central Bank claims on domestic 
nonfinancial real sector. Assets include claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector which includes central, state and local 
governments, nonfinancial public enterprises and private 
sector. Deposit money banks comprise commercial banks and 
other financial institutions that accept transferable deposits, 
such as demand deposits. 1960-2013 
Deposit money 
banks' assets to 
GDP (%) GFDD.DI.02 Depth 
Total assets held by deposit money banks as a share of GDP. 
Assets include claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector 
which includes central, state and local governments, 
nonfinancial public enterprises and private sector. Deposit 
money banks comprise commercial banks and other financial 
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand 
deposits. 1961-2013 
Domestic credit to 
private sector (% 
of GDP) GFDD.DI.14 Depth 
Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector. 1960-2013 
Financial system 
deposits to GDP 
(%) GFDD.DI.08 Depth 
Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks and 
other financial institutions as a share of GDP. 1961-2013 
Insurance 
company assets to 
GDP (%) GFDD.DI.11 Depth Ratio of assets of insurance companies to GDP. 1980-2013 
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Life insurance 
premium volume 
to GDP (%) GFDD.DI.09 Depth 
Ratio of life insurance premium volume to GDP. Premium 
volume is the insurer's direct premiums earned (if 
Property/Casualty) or received (if Life/Health) during the 
previous calendar year. 1990-2013 
Liquid liabilities to 
GDP (%) GFDD.DI.05 Depth 
Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Liquid liabilities are also 
known as broad money, or M3. They are the sum of currency 
and deposits in the central bank (M0), plus transferable 
deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and savings 
deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of 
deposit, and securities repurchase agreements (M2), plus 
travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, commercial 
paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by 
residents. 1961-2013 
Mutual fund assets 
to GDP (%) GFDD.DI.07 Depth 
Ratio of assets of mutual funds to GDP. A mutual fund is a 
type of managed collective investment scheme that pools 
money from many investors to purchase securities. 1980-2013 
Nonbank financial 
institutions’ assets 
to GDP (%) GFDD.DI.03 Depth 
Total assets held by financial institutions that do not accept 
transferable deposits but that perform financial intermediation 
by accepting other types of deposits or by issuing securities or 
other liabilities that are close substitutes for deposits as a share 
of GDP. It covers institutions such as saving and mortgage loan 
institutions, post-office savings institution, building and loan 
associations, finance companies that accept deposits or deposit 
substitutes, development banks, and offshore banking 
institutions.  Assets include claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector such as central-, state- and local 
government, nonfinancial public enterprises and private sector. 1961-2013 
Pension fund 
assets to GDP (%) GFDD.DI.13 Depth 
Ratio of assets of pension funds to GDP. A pension fund is any 
plan, fund, or scheme that provides retirement income. 1990-2013 
Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks and other 
financial GFDD.DI.12 Depth 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP. 1961-2013 
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institutions to GDP 
(%) 
Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks to GDP (%) GFDD.DI.01 Depth 
The financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks as a share of GDP. Domestic money 
banks comprise commercial banks and other financial 
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand 
deposits. 1961-2013 
GDP (Current 
USD) 
NY.GDP.MK
TP.CD 
Economic 
Policy & 
Debt: 
indicators National accounts: US$ at current prices: Aggregate Annual 
Bank lending-
deposit spread GFDD.EI.02 Efficiency 
Difference between lending rate and deposit rate. Lending rate 
is the rate charged by banks on loans to the private sector and 
deposit interest rate is the rate offered by commercial banks on 
three-month deposits. 1980-2013 
Credit to 
government and 
state owned 
enterprises to GDP 
(%) GFDD.EI.08 Efficiency 
Ratio between credit by domestic money banks to the 
government and state-owned enterprises and GDP. 1980-2013 
Bank deposits to 
GDP (%) GFDD.OI.02 Other 
The total value of demand, time and saving deposits at 
domestic deposit money banks as a share of GDP. Deposit 
money banks comprise commercial banks and other financial 
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand 
deposits. 1961-2013 
Banking crisis 
dummy 
(1=banking crisis, 
0=none) GFDD.OI.19 Other 
Dummy variable for the presence of banking crisis (1=banking 
crisis, 0=none) 1970-2011 
Liquid liabilities in 
millions USD 
(2000 constant) GFDD.OI.07 Other 
Absolute value of liquid liabilities in 2000 US million dollars. 
Liquid liabilities are also known as broad money, or M3. They 
are the sum of currency and deposits in the central bank (M0), 
plus transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus 1960-2013 
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time and savings deposits, foreign currency transferable 
deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase 
agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, foreign currency time 
deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or 
market funds held by residents. 
Remittance 
inflows to GDP 
(%) GFDD.OI.13 Other 
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees 
comprise current transfers by migrant workers and wages and 
salaries earned by nonresident workers. Data are the sum of 
three items defined in the fifth edition of the IMF's Balance of 
Payments Manual: workers' remittances, compensation of 
employees, and migrants' transfers. 1970-2013 
Stock market 
return (%, year-on-
year) GFDD.OM.02 Other 
Stock market return is the growth rate of annual average stock 
market index. 1961-2013 
Consumer price 
index (2010=100, 
average) GFDD.OE.02 
Other 
Economic Average Consumer Price Index (2010=100) 1960-2013 
Consumer price 
index (2010=100, 
December) GFDD.OE.01 
Other 
Economic December Consumer Price Index (2010=100) 1960-2013 
Bank credit to 
bank deposits (%) GFDD.SI.04 Stability 
The financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks as a share of total deposits. Domestic 
money banks comprise commercial banks and other financial 
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand 
deposits. Total deposits include demand, time and saving 
deposits in deposit money banks. 1960-2013 
Stock price 
volatility GFDD.SM.01 Stability 
Stock price volatility is the average of the 360-day volatility of 
the national stock market index. 1960-2013 
!
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Figure 3.2: All Independent Variables Tested 
  
X1 'Bank credit to bank deposits (%)',!
X2  'Bank deposits to GDP (%)',!
X3 'Bank lending-deposit spread',!
X4 'Central bank assets to GDP (%)',!
X5 'Credit to government and state owned enterprises to GDP (%)',!
X6 'Deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets and central 
bank assets (%)',!
X7 'Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%)',!
X8 'Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)',!
X9 'Financial system deposits to GDP (%)', !
X10 'GDP (Current USD)',!
X11 'Insurance company assets to GDP (%)',!
X12 'Life insurance premium volume to GDP (%)',!
X13 'Liquid liabilities in millions USD (2000 constant)',!
X14 'Liquid liabilities to GDP (%)', !
X15 'Mutual fund assets to GDP (%)',!
X16 'Nonbank financial institutions’ assets to GDP (%)',!
X17 'Pension fund assets to GDP (%)',!
X18 'Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions 
to GDP (%)',!
X19 'Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%)',!
X20 'Remittance inflows to GDP (%)',!
X21 'Stock market return (%, year-on-year)',!
X22  'Stock price volatility',!
X23 'Banking crisis -1', !
X24 'Banking crisis -2', !
X25 'Log GDP',!
X26 'Log Liquid Liabilities'!
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Figure 3.3: High Income Country List 
 
1.! 'Australia', 
2.! 'Austria', 
3.! 'Belgium', 
4.! 'Canada', 
5.! 'Denmark', 
6.! 'Finland', 
7.! 'Germany', 
8.! 'Iceland', 
9.! 'Ireland', 
10.!'Japan', 
11.!'Luxembourg', 
12.!'Macao SAR, China', 
13.!'Netherlands', 
14.!'Norway', 
15.!'Qatar', 
16.!'Singapore', 
17.!'Sweden', 
18.!'Switzerland', 
19.!'United Kingdom', 
20.!'United States' 
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Figure 3.4 Detailed Country Classification Tree Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Predictor 
Variable 
Node Point Sensitivity Specificity False 
Positive Rate 
Accuracy 
Austria GDP (Current 
USD) 
3.24467e+11 1 1 0 1 
Belgium GDP (Current 
USD) 
3.98812e+11 1 1 0 1 
Denmark Bank deposits to 
GDP (%) 
57.963 1 1 0 1 
Finland Domestic credit 
to private sector 
(% of GDP) 
78.8416 .92 1 .08 .9333 
Germany Bank credit to 
bank deposits (%) 
109.852 1 1 0 1 
Iceland Liquid liabilities 
in millions USD 
(2000 constant) 
10200.2 1 1 0 1 
Ireland Bank credit to 
bank deposits (%) 
182.535 1 1 0 1 
Japan Domestic credit 
to private sector 
(% of GDP) 
200.202 .92 1 .08 .9333 
Luxembourg GDP (Current 
USD) 
3.94013e+10 1 1 0 1 
Netherlands GDP (Current 
USD) 
6.95867e+11 1 1 0 1 
Norway Bank deposits to 
GDP (%) 
52.45 .9259 1 .0741 .9333 
Sweden Domestic credit 
to private sector 
(% of GDP) 
104.959 1 .8889 .8889 .9667 
Switzerland Central bank 
assets to GDP 
(%)* 
.904081 1 1 0 1 
United 
Kingdom 
'Domestic credit 
to private sector 
(% of GDP)', 
147.701 1 1 0 1 
United 
States 
'Domestic credit 
to private sector 
(% of GDP)', 
185.892 1 .8333 0 .9667 
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Figure 3.5 Austria Classification Tree Results 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Belgium Classification Tree Results 
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Figure 3.7 Denmark Classification Tree Results 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Finland Classification Tree Results 
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Figure 3.9 Germany Classification Tree Results 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Iceland Classification Tree Results 
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Figure 3.11 Ireland Classification Tree Results 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Japan Classification Tree Results 
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Figure 3.13 Luxembourg Classification Tree Results 
 
 
Figure 3.14 Netherlands Classification Tree Results 
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Figure 3.15 Norway Classification Tree Results 
 
 
Figure 3.16 Sweden Classification Tree Results 
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Figure 3.17 Switzerland Classification Tree Results 
 
 
Figure 3.18 United Kingdom Classification Tree Results 
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Figure 3.19 United States Classification Tree Results 
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Figure 3.20 Confusion Matrix Measures 2 Year (left) v. 1 Year Forecast (Right) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confusion Matrix 
Sensitivity:  
1 
Specificity:  
0.10 
False Positive:  
0 
Accuracy Rate:  
0.8967 
Confusion Matrix 
Sensitivity:  
0.9963 
Specificity:  
0.2632 
False Positive:  
0.0036832 
Accuracy Rate:  
0.9267 
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Figure 4.1 Financial Soundness Indicators: Reporting Countries and Economies 
 
 
Figure 4.2 U.S. Commercial and Industrial Loans (2006-2016) 
 
 
